What is the self? Where is the self? These have long been vexing questions for mental health practitioners and philosophers alike. In this article I argue that a recent development in the philosophy of Gottlob Frege 1 is helpful in clarifying the debate between reductionists and non-reductionists on these questions.
susceptible to this debate; and (ii) the self presents so variably in personal experiences. I clarify this process as logically dependent on the ordinary ability of the self to present in a wealth of relations, including relations in which the self is estranged (even extraordinarily) from its properties.
Methodologically, my argument presumes that the approach of the philosopher J L Austin is appropriate here in that clarity is sought through the use of language rather than by attempting yet another definition of the self. examine the use of language semantically for this purpose, and I contrast this examination with a syntactic-pragmatic approach to the self.
The need for clarity on the questions what and where the self is, is underscored by the practical need of mental health practitioners who pertinently and perplexedly confront these questions 3 when examining phenomena such as personal experiences of depersonalisation (e.g. 'I watched my body from a distance'), obsessions (e.g. 'I am obsessed by thoughts about swearing unforgivably at the Holy Spirit'), compulsions (e.g. 'These thoughts compel me to check the doors for hours on end'), and delusions of thought insertion (e.g. 'Alien thoughts control and coerce me').
Mental health practitioners and philosophers have come up
with many answers about what the self would be. [4] [5] [6] Some say the self is the Cartesian ego or the thinking substance, or an incorporeal but essentially conscious person. Some simply identify the self with Plato's concept of soul. 7 Reductionist philosophers consider the self a 'mysterious invention' that is better dispensed with altogether, 8 or claim that the self is 'nothing but' a person, a human being, or a particular description. 9 But non-reductionist philosophers claim the self is something unique and that it is distinguishable from concepts of a person, a human being or a description. 10, 11 Reductionists say that the self, being reducible or a mysterious invention, is to be found nowhere. 8, 9 But some non-reductionists claim the self is somewhere elusive. 
Neo-Fregean semantic theory and the position(s) of the self
To ask where the self is, is to ask about the position(s) of the self. The positioning of the self is central to my argument.
The semantic theory of Gottlob Frege, which is based on his philosophy of mathematics and the logic of relations, always symbolises the 'present self' and 'me' always symbolises the 'past self'. 19, 20 Similarly, psychoanalytic theorists have mostly followed the pragmatic tradition by considering the functions and purposes of using first-person pronouns.
5,21-23
The self can be conceptualised and experienced variably
What is the self -from something estranged to something equipped No, the self is equipped with a leg able to kick, and equipped with consciousness and the capacity to kick the ball intentionally. only when sufficiently equipped to do so. This is a rich presentation of the self, whether in the way it is conceptualised (e.g. in philosophy or in psychological theory) or in personal experiences (e.g. in psychotherapy).
The neo-Fregean philosophy also clarifies the location of an impoverished self. An impoverished self would therefore be nowhere or somewhere elusive and perhaps even non-existent when it is (sufficiently) estranged from its properties, whether in reductionistic conceptualisations of the self or in personal experiences.
